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18.1 Introduction: The Legal Pluralism
Critique of Monism
This chapter uses the dynamic federalism model of constitutional dual sovereignty as an
analytic window into the larger legal pluralism discourse that has emerged in recent
decades. Legal pluralism explores the significance of the multiple sources of legal
authority and identity with which individuals simultaneously engage.1 These overlapping sources of normative authority range from local, national, and international
institutions of government to private sources of “quasi-legal” norms generated by tribal,
religious, commercial, professional, or other associations.2 Scholarly advocates of legal
pluralism challenge the tradition of legal monism—so entrenched that its presumptions
often go unnoticed—which views legitimate legal authority as deriving only from an
established source of sovereign or natural authority that unambiguously trumps all
competing forces.3
The broadest conceptions of legal pluralism considers not only the authority rooted
in formal state sovereignty but also normative forces deriving from international trade
practice, indigenous law, religious norms, corporate social responsibility, private arbitral procedures, engineering standards, and others.4 The growing overlap between them
is a byproduct of the increasingly complex infrastructure of legal, political, and private
norm generation within which we all operate.5 Nevertheless, while the vocabulary of
1 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11–12 (arguing for a cosmopolitan pluralist approach, which
recognizes that “we are all fundamentally members of multiple communities, both local and global,
territorial and epistemic,” and that “our conception of law must include more than just officially
sanctioned governmental edicts or formal court documents” because “law does not reside in the
coercive commands of a sovereign power . . . [but] is constantly constructed through the context of
these various norm-generating communities.”).
2 See generally John Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial
Law 24 (1986): 1–56; Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law and Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988):
869–96, 872–73; Gunther Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,” Cardozo Law
Review 13 (1992): 1443–62; Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 168; Nico Krisch, “The
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law,” European Journal of International Law 17 (2006): 247–78;
Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010); Judith Resnik, “Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts,” University of Chicago Law Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 671–760.
3 See, e.g., Alexander Somek, “Monism: A Tale of the Undead?,” in Constitutional Pluralism in the
European Union and Beyond, eds. Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek, 344 (Hart, Oxford, 2012) (defining
“monism” as “the belief that there is only one legal system,” while pronouncing it a dead concept).
Martin Loughlin, “Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?,” Global Constitutionalism 3 (Mar. 2014):
9, 11–14 (discussing the idea of monism in terms of the positivist model of modern public law and
sovereignty, which holds that there can be no plurality or hierarchy of laws because the sovereign state
is the sole and exclusive source of all law).
4 See supra note 1. See especially Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 13, 39, 163–66.
5 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 5 (describing the normative influences from all
forms of society that influence us and our legal structure).
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legal pluralism may be new, the analysis applies to normative overlap that has
been with us for some time. For example, private commercial norms can rival the
importance of international law in business and trade contexts, especially when conflicts undermine state-based legal infrastructure—as occurred after World War II,
when the International Chamber of Commerce harmonized stranded international
business transactions.6 And for some groups, especially indigenous and religious
minorities, the lived experience of many features associated with legal pluralism is
long familiar.7
Constitutional federalism, also characterized by multiple sources of authority within a
single geographical territory, reflects important features of legal pluralism’s positive
account, but avoids the more controversial features of legal pluralism’s normative
account. Indeed, since at least the 1980s, the legal pluralism discourse has generated
considerable scholarly debate over both the positive and normative power of the model.
As a descriptive matter, proponents contend that legal pluralism more accurately
captures the full scope of political contest in pluralist societies, including that within
federal systems,8 and the full array of normative forces operating on individual actors.9
Many also tout the normative value of legal pluralism, arguing that more purposefully

6 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Insa Stephanie Jarass, “Private Uniform Law and Global Legal Pluralism:
The Case of ICC’s Incoterms and the UCP,” TLI Think! (2018), 12.
7 Jennifer Hendry and Melissa L. Tatum, “Justice for Native Nations: Insights from Legal
Pluralism,” Arizona Law Review 60 (Spring 2018): 91–114, 93; Resnik, “Dependent Sovereigns,” supra
note 2; Dalia Tsuk, “The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism,” Florida State University
Law Review 29 (Fall 2001): 189–268; Moraes Godoy, “Globalism, State Law and Legal Pluralism in
Brazil,” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 36, no. 50 (2004): 61–69, 67; Patrick Macklem,
“The Constitutional Identity of Indigenous Peoples in Canada: Status Groups or Federal Actors?,”
in Forms of Pluralism and Democratic Constitutionalism, eds. Jean L. Cohen, Andrew Arato, and
Astrid von Busekist (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Joel A. Nichols, “Religion,
Family Law and Competing Norms,” in Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of
Global and Local Legal Pluralism, ed. Michael A. Helfand (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015), 197–214.
8 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, “Federalism, International Law, and Legal Pluralism,” Missouri Law
Review 73, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 1149–84 (analyzing federalism through the lens of legal pluralism).
9 See, e.g., Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” supra note 2 (describing legal pluralism as “the
presence in a social field of more than one legal order”); Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 2, at 872–73
(noting that “plural normative orders are found in virtually all societies” in Europe and the United
States and that “legal pluralism moves away from questions about the effect of law on society or even
the effect of society on law toward conceptualizing a more complex and interactive relationship
between official and unofficial forms of ordering”); Teubner, supra note 2 (noting that “legal pluralism
rediscovers the subversive power of suppressed discourses,” and advocating for institutions that “bind
law to diverse social discourses . . . suggest[ing] a ‘resonance’ of law with civil society”). Turkuler Isiksel,
“Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm,” Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 2 (July 2013): 160–95, 173–75
(describing “value pluralism,” which acknowledges that diverse cultural, religious, and ethical values
will not always fit under one normative framework); Paul Schiff Berman, “How Legal Pluralism Is and
Is Not Distinct from Liberalism: A Response to Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson,” International
Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 3 (July 2013): 801–808 (defending the claim that legal pluralism
promotes legal discourse between multiple normative communities with hope of converting potential
“enemies” into negotiable adversaries.”).
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engaging these multiple sources of norm generation and legal identity will provide a
better framework for inclusive and deliberative policymaking.10
Yet legal pluralism has also been met with robust opposition. Skeptics critique the
concept for failing to provide a coherent definition of “law” that can distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate normative forces.11 They warn that the unresolved analytical
foundations of legal pluralism will foment intractable political conflicts between irreconcilable underlying principles—especially when the liberal principles that undergird
most western democracies collide with the illiberal principles of competing tribal or
religious rules.12 They argue that embracing legal pluralism will threaten the hardfought accomplishments of national and international institutions, by weakening the
presumed prerogatives of nation-states.13
The legal pluralism literature is itself marked by a plurality of views about how best to
operationalize its normative insights. For example, constitutional pluralism, an important subset of the wider pluralism discourse, sidesteps some anxiety about the threat
pluralism may pose to statehood by focusing exclusively on the relationship between
heterarchical sources of sovereign authority in realms of territorial overlap, especially
the European Union.14 Constitutional pluralism challenges legal monism less forcefully
10 See, e.g., Berman, “How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct,” supra note 9, at 801
(recommending that state and nonstate communities “consciously consider designing procedural
mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices that at least attempt to maximize the opportunity for
plural voices to be heard . . . provid[ing] more ports of entry for more alternative law-making
communities.”); Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism, supra note 2 (proposing “to conceptualize and
develop the postnational order in a pluralist vein, characterized by a multiplicity of legal sub-orders,
not connected through an overarching frame but interacting in often political modes”); Krisch,
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, supra note 2.
11 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, “The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism,”
Journal of Law and Society 20, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 192–217, 192–93 (arguing that “the inability of legal
pluralists to locate agreed definition of ‘law’ ” leads to unstable theoretical foundations, because “no
attempt to formulate a single scientific cross-cultural definition of law can succeed,” and that this
“fundamental ambiguity . . . cuts against legal pluralists’ own expressed interests and concerns.”);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Legal Pluralism,” in A General Jurisprudence of Law and
Society, ed. Brian Z. Tamanaha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) (criticizing the “essentialist
approach to law” held by legal pluralism’s primary supporters).
12 Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,” Sydney
Law Review 30, no. 3 (Sept. 2008): 375–411, 375 (critiquing the failure by the pluralism discourses to
define “law” and articulating an alternative approach); Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson, “The Limits
of Normative Legal Pluralism: Review Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of
Law Beyond Borders,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 3 (July 2013): 783–800
(critiquing the pluralism as disguised liberalism).
13 See Berman, “How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct,” supra note 9 (summarizing the critique
of legal pluralism). The sources cited in notes 11–12, supra, provide further support.
14 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law State, and Nation in the European
Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) (introducing the term “constitutional
pluralism” in his analysis of the European Union); William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 139 (mapping the global law framework); Neil Walker,
“The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,” Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (May 2002): 317–59 (drawing on
political theory to critique “constitutional fetishism” and its “liberal nationalist” bias in favor of a
pluralist alternative); William Twining, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective,” Duke
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than wider legal pluralism, because it is concerned only with sources of state-based,
sovereign authority—avoiding thornier questions about commensurability between
state-based and nonstate sources of law. Still, even constitutional pluralism remains
subject to criticism by those skeptical of the mechanics of heterarchical legal pluralism
in any form.
By each of these views, however, legal pluralism has framed a powerful critique of the
hegemonic monist vision of law that provoked it. Even if the legal pluralists’ normative
proposals never satisfy their critics, they have indelibly reshaped the way that the scholarly community reflects on competing normative forces within society. Legal pluralism
forces us to consider whether the traditional monist model is, at best, overly simplistic,
and at worst, harmfully divorced from the intersecting personal and political dynamics
that challenge the overall legal enterprise. While debate continues over the workability
of nonhierarchical pluralism as a normative project, even legal pluralism skeptics have
acknowledged that the pluralist critique provides an important descriptive account of
the normative complexity within cosmopolitan societies.15
Without engaging the full debate over legal pluralism, this chapter explores the realm
in which legal pluralism is least controversially and most undeniably made manifest—
constitutional federalism. Federal systems are founded on the premise that multiple
sources of sovereign authority create simultaneous normative forces on the legal actors
within them, including individuals, businesses, municipalities, and other associations.
Just as constitutional pluralism is less fraught than wider legal pluralism, considering
only sovereign authority, hierarchical systems of federalism are yet one step further
removed from the fray, resolving some of the heterarchical uncertainty created by
constitutional pluralism through the ordering device of federal supremacy.
For that reason, acknowledging the legal pluralism inherent within federal systems
of government does not resolve legal pluralism’s larger challenge to “statism” and the
Journal of Comparative and International Law 20, no. 3 (Spring 2010): 473–518, 505–506; Berman,
Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1 (arguing for a “cosmopolitan pluralist approach” for navigating
global legal spaces); Loughlin, supra note 3, at 9 (examining the origins of the constitutional pluralism
discourse, critically assessing its claims, and contending that it is ultimately an oxymoronic concept);
Paul Schiff Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global
Pluralism,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20, no. 2 (2013): 665–96 (proposing a model of
“jurisgenerative constitutionalism,” a middle ground between strict territorialism and universalism, to
“manage, without eliminating, the plural voices clamoring to be heard”); Neil Walker, “Constitutional
Pluralism Revisited,” European Law Journal 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 333–55 (arguing that constitutional
pluralism offers a better account of the European Union than purely monist or federalist alternatives).
15 See, e.g., Berman, “How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct,” supra note 9 (in responding to
Galán and Patterson’s critique of his pluralism normative proposals, first noting the significance of the
fact that they accepted his pluralism descriptive account). He writes: “Galán and Patterson, in their
thoughtful review of the book, largely accept the [descriptive] first argument and reserve most of their
critique for the [normative] second . . . treat[ing] this argument as sufficiently self-evident, or
‘commonplace’ (to use their word) that it does not even merit much discussion. That is remarkable in
and of itself, and it represents a sea change from the status quo circa 2000 when . . . there were no
mainstream international law scholars in the United States at that time advocating legal pluralism as a
descriptive framework.” Ibid., 801.
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questions it raises about the relationship between state and nonstate sources of
normative authority.16 Nonetheless, the structural features of federalism can provide
valuable platforms for cross-jurisdictional deliberation and policymaking that resonate with pluralist good-governance proposals. Normative legal pluralists argue that
governance architects should endow institutions with more inclusive procedural
mechanisms that encourage dialogue and engagement, providing multiple ports of
entry for normative communities seeking to be heard.17 When more normative interest
groups are enabled to participate in rule generation, goes this argument, the resulting
order will be more robust and representative of the overall society’s concerns.
Many of these are the precise benefits touted by proponents of the dynamic model of
federalism describing American governance,18 where the mechanics of dual sovereignty
16 See, e.g., Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14, at 344 (noting the statist
roots of federalism that distinguishes it from fuller pluralism).
17 See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 237; Judith Resnik, “Law’s Migration
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry,” Yale Law Journal
115, no. 7 (May 2005): 1564–671, 1579 (referring to multiple ports of entry).
18 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, “The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation,” William and Mary Law Review 22, no. 4 (Summer 1981): 639–82 (discussing the benefits of
jurisdictional overlap, including more robust error correction, norm articulation, and creative
innovation). Indeed, the literature on American federalism has exploded in recent years with
interesting new perspectives on dynamic and innovative federalism theory. While all sources are too
numerous to list, a worthy tour of books would include: Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War
Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7–8; John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How
States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009);
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 21st
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008);
and Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutionalism Enterprise:
A Historical Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
A similarly lengthy (though incomplete) tour of law review articles would include
Heather K. Gerken, “Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,” Yale Law Journal 123, no. 6
(Apr. 2014): 1889–919; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Federalism as a Constitutional Concept,” Arizona State
Law Journal 49, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 961–84; Jessica Bulman-Pozen, “Partisan Federalism,” Harvard Law
Review 127, no. 4 (Feb. 2014): 1077–146; Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken, “Uncooperative
Federalism,” Yale Law Journal 118, no. 7 (May 2009): 1256–311, 1258–60; David E. Adelman and
Kirsten H. Engel, “Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority,” Minnesota Law Review 92, no. 6 (June 2008): 1796–850 (rejecting the static optimization
model of federalism for the emerging trend of dynamic federalism); William W. Buzbee, “Interaction’s
Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons,” Emory Law Journal
57 (2007): 145–66; Kirsten H. Engel, “Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law,” Emory Law Journal 56 (2006): 159–88; Heather K. Gerken, “The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” Harvard Law Review 124 (Nov. 2010): 4–74, 34–44;
Abbe R. Gluck, “Our [National] Federalism,” Yale Law Journal 123, no. 6 (Apr. 2014): 1996–2043; Judith
Resnik, Joshua Civin, and Joseph B. Frueh, “Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs),” Arizona Law Review 50
(2008): 709–86; Hari M. Osofsky, Jessica Shadian, and Sara Fechtelkotter, “Arctic Energy Cooperation,”
U.C. Davis Law Review 49, no. 4 (Apr. 2016): 1431–510; Hannah Wiseman, “Moving Past Dual
Federalism to Achieve Electric Grid Neutrality,” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015): 97–108; Franita Tolson,
“Election Law ‘Federalism’ and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination Framework,” William and Mary
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provide multiple opportunities for interest groups and stakeholders to participate in
legal policymaking at different points of jurisdictional scale.19 These “multiple ports of
entry,” a hallmark of legal pluralism,20 ensure that resulting legal policies are better
informed by the full panoply of values and interests at stake than they could under a
fully centralized (or monist) approach. Arguably inefficient and rife with uncertainty,
federalism—like legal pluralism—nevertheless allows a creative space for contestation
and dialogue, enabling the various tensions within the system to play themselves out
within the structure of the system itself.
This chapter thus uses federalism as a lens to explore the pluralist critique and its
proposals for inclusive norm generation. It presents federalism as a “vanilla” example of
legal pluralism at work, so tame by comparison to full pluralism that it threatens to bore
even the constitutional pluralists.21 Even so, there are noteworthy parallels between the
positive and normative claims of legal pluralism and federalism, especially the dynamic
model federalism. Probed here, these include a shared emphasis on the creation of systemic spaces for dialogue, contestation, and negotiation between competing interest
groups (normative interests in the case of pluralism, and jurisdictional interests in the
case of federalism). Both models embrace procedural tools for generating consensus
when substantive agreement is unforthcoming, and both reject the “zero-sum” models
of governance that preceded them. The analogy between dynamic federalism and legal
pluralism also raises interesting questions about the wider relationship between statebased law and nonstate normative authority.

Law Review 59, no. 5 (Apr. 2018): 2211–84; Hari M. Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman, “Dynamic Energy
Federalism,” Maryland Law Review 72, no. 3 (2013): 773–843; Hari M. Osofsky, “Diagonal Federalism
and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration,” Alabama Law Review 62, no. 2
(2011): 237–304; and many others.
More traditional and historical perspectives are also an important part of the recent federalism
discourse. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009); Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012); Ernest A. Young, “Federalism as a Check on Executive Authority: State Public
Litigation, Executive Authority, and Political Polarization,” Texas Review of Law and Politics 22, no. 2
(Winter 2017–2018): 305–16; and equally many others as well.
19 Much of my own federalism scholarship has been devoted to this point. See generally Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18; Erin Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” Oregon Law
Review 96 (2017): 123–84; Erin Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” Boston College Law Review 52 (Jan.
2011): 1–136; Erin Ryan, “Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability
Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure,” University of Colorado Law Review 81 (2010): 1–96; Erin
Ryan, “Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional
Gray Area,” Maryland Law Review 66, no. 3 (2007): 503–667. See also Erin Ryan, “Environmental
Federalism’s Tug of War Within,” in Law and Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative
Analysis, ed. Kaylani Robbins (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 355–418; Erin Ryan,
“The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within,” in The Ways of
Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain, eds. Alberto López
Basaguren and Leire Escajedo San Epifanio, vol. 1 (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2013), 267–302.
20 See Resnik, supra note 17; Berman, supra note 1.
21 Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14, at 342.
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 18.2 introduces federalism as system of dual
sovereignty, briefly reviewing the American and European models. It presents federalism as an example of simple pluralism, characterized by overlapping sources of sovereign authority, and explores the convergence between normative legal pluralism and
dynamic federalism. Section 18.3 considers examples of negotiated governance in
American federalism to assess the claims by normative pluralism for more inclusive dialogic governance. After cataloging various forms of negotiated federalism in the United
States, it considers the benefits that dialogic processes can confer on governance and
explores the legitimizing values of bargained-for consensus as a procedural impasse
tool. Finally, section 18.4 considers three meta-phenomena shared by legal pluralism
and dynamic federalism: their disaggregable positive and normative accounts, their
rejection of the categorical zero-sum assumptions that weakened their predecessors,
and the challenges they each face contending with circumstances in which the zero-sum
analysis may hold currency.

18.2 Federalism as Legal Pluralism
Federalism provides a working model of legal pluralism in its simplest form, one that
seems as uncontroversial as it is incontrovertible. Pioneered in the United States and
evolved in the European Union and other nations around the world,22 federalism is a
system of government that divides power between a central administration and regional
subunits, each with separate authority to directly regulate their mutual citizens.23
In the late eighteenth century, the American invention of dual sovereignty represented a revolutionary break with the monist, monarchical norms of the contemporary
European powers and other monist orders around the world, such as the great dynastic
reigns of East Asia.24 At the time, the possibility that multiple sovereigns could operate
within the same geographic territory was a truly radical idea.25 Hundreds of years later,
the contemporary federalism discourse mirrors the newer legal pluralism discourse in
important ways, especially regarding the emerging model of dynamic federalism.
This section reviews federalism as system of dual sovereignty, briefly exploring the
American and European models. It presents federalism as an example of simple pluralism, characterized by multiple sources of sovereign authority. It then explores the
convergence between normative legal pluralism and dynamic federalism, especially
revealed in their shared emphasis on dialogic processes and negotiation as a path toward
good governance.
22 “Countries,” Forum of Federations, http://www.forumfed.org/countries/ (accessed Mar. 30, 2019).
23 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 7.
24 See generally Alison L. Lacroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2010); Purcell, supra note 18.
25 See Lacroix, supra note 24.
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18.2.1 Federalism as Dual Sovereignty
At its heart, federalism provides a mechanism for allocating authority that assesses
which kinds of policies should be set centrally—yielding the same answer throughout
the federation, and which should be decided more locally—enabling different answers
in different parts of the federation.26 Accordingly, the basic inquiry in federalism is usually: who should get to decide?27 Should the local28 or central government be entitled to
make a final policy decision?29 (Or indeed, some level between or beyond the two?)
Dual sovereignty focuses constitutional attention on the local and national levels, and
this duality gave rise to the traditional model of “dual federalism,” which views the two
levels of government as working in relative isolation.30 However, this separationist
model has been challenged by a newer, “dynamic federalism” model that recognizes the
many ways in which the agents of multiscalar governance cross porous jurisdictional
boundaries to collaborate, compete, and negotiate for influence over the direction of
shared policy concerns.31
Today, twenty-five nations containing some 40 percent of the world’s population have
crafted domestic systems of governance based on the principles of federalism.32 Other
nations, some of them with their own domestic federal systems, also participate in
transnational federations, such as the twenty-eight nations that are currently member
states within the European Union.33 Every system of federalism developed in response
to unique historical circumstances, so no federalism is the same as any other.34
26 Erin Ryan, “Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as a Strategy for Good
Governance,” Wisconsin Law Review Forward 2017: 17–39.
27 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at xi–xii.
28 In this broad discussion of federal, I frequently use “local” to refer to the constitutionally
subfederal units, and “central” or “national” to refer to the federation. In the United States, the local
units are the fifty states, whereas in the European Union, they are the twenty-eight member nations.
There are often even more local levels of government within the local units of a federal system, such as
municipal or regional governments (or even the nested subfederal units of an EU member state with
domestic federalism, such as the sixteen German Laender), but I group them together for the purposes
of this discussion, as they are not usually endowed with separate sovereign authority cognizable under
the larger federation.
29 And by extension, who should get to decide that? The judiciary? The legislature? Someone else? In
the United States, the federalism safeguards debate continues to probe this question at length. See
Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 273–76; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 14–19.
30 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 109–44.
31 Ibid., xxvi–xxvii (discussing the emergence of the dynamic federalism model); Erin Ryan,
“Negotiating Environmental Federalism,” supra note 26, at 37 (discussing the entrenchment of dynamic
federalism model). See also sources cited supra note 18. Dynamic federalism is further discussed later,
infra notes 83–91.
32 “Countries,” Forum of Federations, http://www.forumfed.org/countries/ (accessed Mar. 30, 2019).
33 “European Union,” Citizens Information, https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_
ireland/european_government/european_union/european_union.html(accessed Mar. 30, 2019).
34 Douglas Laycock, “Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The U.S. Experience,” in Patterns of
Regionalism and Federalism: Lessons for the UK, eds. Jörg Fedtke and Basil S. Markesinis (Oxford, UK:
Hart Publishing, 2006), 119–48, 119.
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Accordingly, while this chapter focuses on the American system with which I am most
familiar, important distinctions prevent it from serving as a representative for European
federalism, or that of any other nation.35 Still, most federal systems are similarly characterized by the presence of multiple levels of government empowered with distinct
sources of sovereign power, such that none can fully displace the others within their
specifically designated realms of authority.36

18.2.1.1 The American Model
In the United States, for example, separately sourced authority is vested in the
national government and fifty regional states. As I have described in previous work,37
the U.S. Constitution confers a set of sovereign powers on the national government,
while reserving to the states the residual sovereign authority associated with their
preconstitutional police powers to regulate for the public health, safety, and welfare.38
The list of “enumerated” powers delegated to the central administration includes
both specific powers (such as those over postal roads, copyrights, and war)39 and
comparatively open-ended powers (to tax and spend for the public welfare, to regulate interstate commerce, and to regulate as “necessary and proper” for carrying out
other enumerated powers).40
Where legitimate national governance conflicts with state or local law, the central
(or “federal”) law has preemptive force under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.41
However, the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment clarifies that those powers not delegated
to the national government are reserved to the states (or to the people), indicating their
retention of this separately sourced sovereign authority.42 The dividing line between
local and national authority is not always clear,43 nodding toward the uncertainties of
constitutional pluralism.44 Accordingly, American federalism is sometimes portrayed
as a brute force contest between state and federal power, but it is better characterized as

35 Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 163–64 (noting the limitations of an analysis of
American federalism as a model for other federalisms).
36 See, e.g., ibid., 149–51 (discussing the American model of federalism).
37 The following summary of American federalism first appeared in Erin Ryan, “Secession and
Federalism,” supra note 19, at 149.
38 Ibid. “The states further disseminate their power locally among municipal agencies, and
occasionally laterally, in partnerships with other states by constitutionally permissible interstate
compacts.” Ibid., 50.
39 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, 8, 11.
40 Ibid. cl. 1, 3, 18. See also Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 8–10.
41 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
42 Ibid. amend. X.
43 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 145–80.
44 Leonardo Pierdominici, “The Theory of EU Constitutional Pluralism: A Crisis in a Crisis?,”
Perspectives on Federalism 9, no. 2 (2017): 119–53, 127 (noting that “in a system of constitutional
pluralism ‘it is possible that each [constitutional order] acknowledge the legitimacy of every other
within its own sphere, while none asserts or acknowledges the constitutional superiority over
another’ ”) (quoting Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European
Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 102).
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“a site of negotiation in which political actors at various levels of government work out a
continually shifting balance between competing good governance values.”45
In previous work, I have argued that the interpretive touchstone for allocating contested authority in zones of jurisdictional overlap should be the advancement of the
good-governance principles that undergird federalism,46 such as maintaining checks
and balances, fostering transparency and accountability, balancing autonomy and interdependence, and harnessing distinctly local and national governing capacity:
Federalism is, at its heart, a strategy for good governance—based on a set of clear
values that we hope federalism will help us accomplish[:] the maintenance of
(1) checks and balances between opposing centers of power that protect individuals,
(2) governmental accountability and transparency that enhance democratic participation, (3) local autonomy that enables interjurisdictional innovation and competition, (4) centralized authority to manage collective action problems and vindicate
core constitutional promises, and finally (5) the regulatory problem-solving synergy
that federalism enables between the unique governance capacities of local and
national actors for coping with problems that neither can resolve alone.47

Governance in pursuit of these values channels the normative forces of competing
sovereign authority toward worthy ends. Hewing closely to these directives, good
governance:
advances individual dignity within healthy communities. It enhances democratic
governance principles of self-determination while recognizing the responsibilities
that group members hold toward one another. It creates a laboratory for innovations
in governance from multiple possible sources and facilitates multiple planes of
negotiation among competing interests and interest groups. It appropriately honors
both sides of the subsidiarity principle—the directive to solve problems at the most
local level possible—which notably couples its preference for local autonomy in
governance with the expectation of effective regulatory problem-solving (and by
implication, at whatever level will achieve it).48

That said, good governance values can conflict in a given instance,49 opening possibilities for multiple sovereign decision makers to reach different conclusions about how
45 See Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 153–54.
46 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at xxvi–xxvii, 34–67 (specifically detailing the
values of checks, transparency, localism, and synergy and dealing more holistically with the
nationalism values necessarily implied by a federal system).
47 Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 154 (summarizing the values outlined in Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, and explicitly adding the value of centralized authority).
48 Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 154.
49 Ibid., 155–56 (“Nevertheless, identifying what federalism is designed to accomplish is only the first
part of the puzzle. The harder task is figuring out how these goals fit together. The core federalism
values are doubtlessly all good things in and of themselves, and American governance has long aspired
to realize each of them independently. Yet our success has been complicated by the fact that each
individual value is suspended in a web of tensions with the others. No matter how we may try, the hard
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best to move forward. Productively navigating conflicts among different good-faith
interpretations of what good governance demands is the greatest challenge for all multilevel systems of government.
Nevertheless, the unbridled constitutional pluralism that federalism might unleash
is tempered in nations like the United States by use of a hierarchical preemption
directive—here, the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause—to regulate jurisdictional
overlap. A preemption directive is a constitutional ordering device that explicitly
privileges the authority of one sovereign authority over another in a potential zone of
jurisdictional conflict. For example, in the United States, most state and municipal
government authority extends broadly to whatever is required to protect the public welfare, while the national government may act only to specifically enumerated powers.50
However, the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause gives priority to legitimately
exercised national power over state or municipal authority where they conflict.51
Thus, in realms of legitimate jurisdictional overlap, the federal decision maker may hierarchically override conflicting decisions by a state or local authority.
Preemption directives cut against the heterarchy of pure constitutional pluralism, but
they affirm the essential legal pluralism inherent within federalism by anticipating the
conflicts that will arise by the simultaneous operation of distinct sources of sovereign
authority. They are designed to mitigate the difficulties that arise when competing
sovereign agents come to contrasting conclusions about how to use their authority in
shared regulatory arenas, a problem that has grown in tandem with the expansion of
shared regulatory arenas.52 These controversies have intensified as growing national
(and international) interdependence widens the scope of jurisdictional overlap,53
together with increasing regulatory competition from sources of normative authority
that lack constitutional parity in places like the United States, such municipal governance,
regional partnerships between states,54 and separately sovereign indigenous peoples.55
truth is that they all cannot always be satisfied simultaneously in any given context. The regulatory
choices we make inevitably involve tradeoffs, in which one value may partially eclipse another.”).
50 See Ryan, “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within,” supra note 19, at 387–88 (observing
the origins of state power in the traditional police powers of government to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare); Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 8–10 (discussing
constitutionally enumerated federal powers).
51 U.S. Const. art. IV (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
52 See Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 151–52.
53 See Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 355–57. This zone of overlap, an
“interjurisdictional gray area,” arises whenever both the local and national levels of government have
simultaneous interests or obligations. Ibid., 145–80.
54 See, e.g., Gerken, “Federalism All the Way Down,” supra note 18, at 34–44 (discussing the
dynamics of jurisdictional overlap at multiple levels); Resnik, Civin, and Frueh, “Ratifying Kyoto,”
supra note 18; Hari M. Osofsky, “Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the
Obama Administration,” Alabama Law Review 62, no. 2 (2011): 237–304.
55 Indeed, unresolved aspects of the relationship between the sovereign authority of the United
States and Canada and that of the Native American tribal nations that preceded them have prompted
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Yet expanding overlap does not necessarily imply more preemption, as the benefiting
sovereign often yields its constitutional privilege for political or prudential reasons.
In the United States, for example, federal regulators routinely cede authority to state
or local partners within programs of cooperative federalism,56 and federal courts
routinely yield their supremacy to state courts under various abstention and preclusion doctrines.57
Moreover, although the Supremacy Clause favors national authority where there
are legitimate conflicts, the structure of American dual sovereignty ensures that
no level of government possesses absolute power, so neither the national nor local
level can fully displace the other. In congruence with the principle of subsidiarity,
regulatory matters are generally governed at the most local level with capacity to
resolve them.58 In the United States, the constitutional enumeration of powers tracks
those regulatory arenas in which central governance is presumed necessary, and
leaves other matters to the competence of state or local governance.59 As such, the
fifty American states deal separately with issues that fall within their exclusive regulatory purviews (for example, most issues of family law, education, land use, healthcare, and criminal law), and they variously engage with the national government
and one another to cope with issues that straddle jurisdictional boundaries (often
including environmental law, public health, national security, and many aspects of
commercial law).60

the most important legal pluralism movements in North America. See Resnik, “Dependent Sovereigns,”
supra note 2; Hendry and Tatum, supra note 7, at 92; Tsuk, supra note 7, at 199; Frank Pommerscheim,
“ ‘Our Federalism’ in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal
Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community,” University of Colorado Law Review 71 (2000): 123–90,
134–35.
56 See Ryan, “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within,” supra note 19, at 393 (“The Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause affirms that the legitimate exercise of federal authority can always trump conflicting
state law, but federal law often leaves purposeful space for local participation even when Congress
could theoretically preempt an entire regulatory field—especially in environmental law. Notwithstanding
enumerated federal authority over commerce and the channels of interstate commerce, international
treaties and foreign relations, federal property, military readiness, national security, and others,
Congress usually leaves space for local participation to engage regulatory expertise or capacity that
local governments have, but the federal government does not. For that reason, the more difficult
preemption question in these contexts is not whether the federal government could preempt, but
whether (and to what degree) it should.”).
57 Mathew D. Staver, “The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court
Intervention,” Seton Hall Law Review 28, no. 4 (1998): 1102–54, 1115 n.84; David L. Shapiro,
“Jurisdiction and Discretion,” New York University Law Review 60, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 543–89,
549–50, 581 (noting that Younger is “[t]he present-day heir” to a tradition in which “comity
concerns . . . led English courts to refuse to enjoin proceedings in Scotland, even though Scottish
and English courts are tribunals of the same sovereign”).
58 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 59–60.
59 Ibid., 61–63.
60 See ibid., xii–xvi (discussing jurisdictional overlap in the United States); ibid, 265–70 (discussing
various ways that state and federal actors negotiate their way through the tangle of jurisdictional
overlap).
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18.2.1.2 The European Model
There are similarities in the allocation of central and regional authority within the
European Union,61 but also important differences from the American model. To begin
with, it operates from a less settled constitutional order, and from a far less settled theory
of federal hierarchy (or heterarchy, as the case may be).62 The constitutional pluralism
discourse first arose in response to the problem of defining and defending the operation
of the European Union in the absence of a fully theorized account of the relationship
between its legal system and that of its individual member states—especially after the
jurisdiction of the Union was expanded in the early 1990s under the Maastricht Treaty.63
For example, Germany is one of the primary champions of the European Union, but the
German Constitutional Court has sparred with the EU Court of Justice in resisting the
preemptive force of EU institutions when efforts to protect the fiscal health of the union
conflicted with German economic sovereignty.64
As Professor Neil Walker has explained, the very nature of the EU federation remains
contested among legal theorists.65 While most commentators are satisfied to categorize
the European Union as a federal system, given its defining characteristics as a central
administration with regional subunits possessed of separate authority,66 other theorists
point to unresolved problems with the federal designation—including the muddiness of
the federal constitution,67 the unresolved preemptive force of its legal system,68 and the
61 “FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers,” The European Citizens’
Initiative, https://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq (accessed Mar. 30, 2019).
62 See Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14.
63 Ibid., 339–40.
64 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (Ger.) (decision by the German
Constitutional Court demonstrating that even where it accepts the preemptive force of EU law, it will
continue to review the actions of European institutions to ensure they remain within the proper limits
of their authority); but see the German Constitutional Court on the German Ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty, BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009–2 BvE 2/08 (decision by the German
Constitutional Court finding no constitutional objections to the Lisbon Treaty, which affirmed and
clarified the scope of EU authority by amending the two treaties that form its constitutional basis).
More recently, see Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 2015 (in the first ever case referred
to the European Court of Justice by the German Constitutional Court, holding that an EU agency was
authorized to selectively purchase Eurozone government bonds in secondary markets). See also
Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14 (discussing these difficulties); Daniel
Kelemen, “On the Unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism: European Supremacy and the Survival
of the Eurozone,” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23 (2016): 136–50.
65 See Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14, at 342–47.
66 Ibid., 343.
67 At present, EU authority arises from a series of treaties that, taken together, serve as a constitution.
In 2004, the EU parliament attempted to consolidate the constitution in a single document, the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, but only eighteen of the twenty-five member states at the time
ratified it. After voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty, the remaining
states canceled their referenda. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty entered force, including many of the changes
sought by the Constitutional Treaty, but formulated as amendments to the existing treaties. Stephen
Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 12th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 18–19
(describing the history of the treaties that made up the Constitutional makeup of the European Union,
concluding with the Lisbon Treaty that amended the two prior treaties forming the constitutional basis
for the European Union after the failure of the proposed Constitutional Treaty).
68 Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14, at 348 (discussing EU preemption
conflicts in Germany).
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lack of a consistent consensus among key constituencies to identify as a federal union.69
European pluralists argue that a more heterarchical brand of constitutional pluralism
better describes the European Union today, one that emphasizes the separate constitutional integrity of the member states and the federation, without asserting the constitutional superiority of one over the other.70
Walker observes that successful constitutional pluralism in Europe requires a heavier
theoretical lift than most pluralists have thus far provided, but he makes a credible
attempt. Comparing it to a purely federal model, he reflects on two critical features that
an EU pluralist constitutional order must achieve: “Like the federal solution, its settlement should enjoy a deeper and wider endorsement across its various constituencies;
yet unlike the federal solution, that endorsement should not be such as to undermine
the order’s basic condition of duality.”71 The constitutional pluralism that Walker aspires
to on behalf of the European Union contrasts with the U.S. model of federalism in
restraining federal supremacy but reflects it in recognizing that jurisdictional overlap
can strengthen the operation of independent sovereign authorities, rather than
undermine them.72

18.2.2 Federalism as Pluralism
While federalism departs from pure legal pluralism and even constitutional pluralism
in important ways,73 its endemic pluralism is most apparent in the overlapping jurisdictional reach of the local, national, and even international institutions within which
its denizens function—and the multiple legal identities such jurisdictional overlap creates for them. For example, an American living in Houston is, at the bare minimum,
both a Texan and an American (and as any Texan will tell you, there is plenty of friction
69 Ibid., 343, 345–47.
70 Ibid., 352. See also Pierdominici, supra note 44, at 127 (“[N]ot only does the question of final
constitutional authority remain open in the EU, but it ought to be left open, since heterarchy . . . is
superior to hierarchy as a normative ideal in circumstances of competing constitutional claims of
ultimate authority . . . for here the fact is that the recognition of the legitimacy of the EU constitutional
claim, and the idea that competing constitutional claims such as the supranational and the national
ones are of equal legitimacy or, at least, cannot be balanced against each other once and for all. As
MacCormick put it, in a system of constitutional pluralism ‘it is possible that each [constitutional
order] acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none asserts or
acknowledges the constitutional superiority over another.’ ”).
71 Walker, “Constitutional Pluralism Revisited,” supra note 14, at 346.
72 Ibid., 352 (“While any new constitutional settlement cannot be a constitution of the whole without
seeming to beckon a full-blown federal state, unless that new settlement nevertheless succeeds in
standing autonomously from the state constitutions within its own common sphere of competence, and
so on an equal footing with these state constitutions, the authoritative sense and commitment of its
being an independent act of collective authorship by the European people acting together is lost. And
in this way, we can finally envisage how the overlap of heterarchically related constitutional authorities
of the common part and the local parts, rather than undermining or eroding the legitimacy of each
such authority, becomes a condition of legitimacy of the combined whole.”).
73 Ibid., 342–46.
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between those two legal identities).74 At a minimum, a German citizen of Munich is
simultaneously Bavarian, German, a member of the European Union, subject to the
NATO Alliance, and under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
As federalism scholars have noted, these overlapping legal identities become constitutive factors for individuals within federal systems.75 They impel citizens in complex,
sometimes conflicting, often confusing directions—as for the Scottish citizens who
overwhelmingly opposed Brexit, but must prepare to leave the European Union with the
rest of the United Kingdom.76 However, complex legal identities can also be enlightening.
They promote cosmopolitanism, enabling those engaged with them to better appreciate
the breadth of conflicting values so often at stake in difficult policy contexts.77 As
Professor Jean Leclair has described in the Canadian context, “In Canada, federalism
makes it possible for citizens, who so desire, to refuse to be instrumentalized by nationalist programs, all of which have the common denominator of flattening the teeming
complexity of their lives; it can be used to undo the clasps of the cultural straightjackets
that people are forced into.”78
Other aspects of federalism cut against pluralism.79 As noted, strong federal supremacy in the American model moderates the challenges of heterarchical pluralism by
subjecting jurisdictional conflicts to a hierarchy that privileges national authority.
National preemption is a feature of many federal systems that cuts against both the
advantages and disadvantages of full pluralism. When national authority reflexively
preempts conflicting local authority, any benefits of the dialogic process touted by
pluralists will be lost. Nevertheless, enabling preemption also resolves some of the
uncertainty created by pluralism that its skeptics assail. Preemption appropriately
curbs potential excesses of pluralism in contexts where the need for decisive action—
perhaps to respond in an emergency or to resolve unsurmountable collective action
74 Cf. Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 132–33 (discussing the semi-regular, mostly
rhetorical calls for Texas to secede from the United States).
75 See Jean Leclair, “Federalism as Rejection of Nationalist Monisms,” in The Trust/Distrust Dynamic
in Multinational Democracies: Canada in Comparative Perspective, eds. Dimitrios Karmis and François
Rocher (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018), 210–47, 217 (arguing that legal
monism, compellingly framed as “methodological nationalism,” obscures the way in which “Canadian
federalism is—and always has been—the place of confrontations between two mutually exclusive
nationalist programs” and political identities).
76 “EU Referendum: Northern Ireland Votes to Remain,” BBC, June 24, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-northern-ireland-36614443 (reporting that 62 percent of Scotland voted to remain). The
conflict between these legal identities on this point may yet produce a divorce. “Brexit Could Sway
Scottish Voters toward Independence from UK: Poll,” Reuters, Sept. 2, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-britain-eu-scotland/
brexit-could-sway-scottish-voters-toward-independence-from-uk-poll-idUSKCN1LI0UK.
77 Cf. Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid, “Cosmopolitanism, Tolerance and Educational
Encounters,” in Tolerance and Dissent within Education: On Cultivating Debate and Understanding, eds.
Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 151–66; Jacques
Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001).
78 Id. at 233–34.
79 But see Berman, “Federalism, International Law, and Legal Pluralism,” supra note 8, at 1153
(analyzing federalism and international law through a pluralist rather than a sovereigntist lens).
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problems—outweighs the need for additional deliberation.80 From the perspective of
most federal nations, it is a worthwhile trade-off in most contexts.
Moreover, other features within federalism moderate the dialogic costs of preemption by facilitating local input to federal policymaking. For example, most federal legislatures are composed of local representatives, providing a straightforward path for local
input into national deliberation.81 The American model further enables agents at all levels of government to wield significant influence in the making of interjurisdictionally
relevant policy, even where local authority is validly subject to federal preemption.82 As
I have previously observed, “many of the most interesting preemption debates in the
United States have shifted from questions about whether the national government could
preempt local involvement to whether it should preempt,” given the many benefits of
engaging multiscalar input.83 The relationship between multiple sources of sovereign
authority in the European Union are even more complex, given that member states have
taken inconsistent positions on nature of the hierarchy between EU legal authority and
the conflicting domestic authority of the member states.84

18.2.3 Dynamic Federalism as Legal Pluralism
Synergy between the ideals of pluralism and the practice of federalism are especially
salient in federal systems characterized by the dynamic model of federalism that has
disrupted the American discourse in recent years.85
Dynamic federalism emphasizes fluidity and overlap between multiple sources of
authority in advancing the good-governance principles that undergird federalism.86 As
noted, the new model departs from its separationist predecessor, dual federalism,
which guards an idealized boundary between distinct spheres of local and national
jurisdiction, minimizing overlap and cross-fertilization in policymaking.87 Yet just as
80 Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 152–53; Edward Millican, One United People:
The Federalist Papers and the National Idea (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990).
81 These “political safeguards” of federalism have been copiously digested by the Federalism
Safeguards literature. See Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 273–76; Ryan,
“Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 14–19; Herbert Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,”
Columbia Law Review 54, no. 4 (Apr. 1954): 543–60, 588.
82 See Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 265–338. The interjurisdictional dynamics American governance are also reviewed in many
of the sources cited supra in note 18.
83 See Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 26–27; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War,
supra note 18, at 387–98 (untangling jurisdictional separation and overlap).
84 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing conflicts between the German
Constitutional Court and EU Court of Justice over the scope of federal preemption in economic
contexts).
85 See supra note 31.
86 See supra notes 46–47 (discussing the good governance principles underlying federalism).
87 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 109–44.
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traditional monist assumptions have come under assault by the pluralist critique,
American federalism scholars and participants have increasingly recognized that the
enterprise is marked more by competitive and collaborative dynamics than the mutually
exclusive tracks of the old model.88 Analogous to the positive account of pluralism, the
dynamic model describes a federalism thick with exchange among multiple stakeholders whose values and interests become more salient at different points of jurisdictional
scale.89 And analogous to the normative account of pluralism, dynamic federalism
affirmatively recognizes the value of this rich, multiscalar exchange.90
Systems of dynamic federalism converge with the more normative visions of pluralism at
the structural level, by enabling multiple platforms in governance for competing interest
groups to vie for influence over the direction of policymaking.91 In creating multiple ports
of entry for deliberative policymaking at different levels of government, federalism
increases valuable opportunities for participation, exchange, and negotiated policymaking
between competing interests and values—just as the normative pluralism proponents
advocate.92 Moreover, claims in support of both dynamic federalism and legal pluralism
contend that consensus-based dialogic processes are often the best available option for
shepherding sustainable governance outcomes in the absence of substantive agreement.93
A key assumption shared by the proponents of pluralism and federalism is that gov
ernance proceeds best when decisions are taken with the benefit of as much stakeholder
input as is feasible. For example, Professor Paul Schiff Berman has argued that providing
alternative lawmaking communities more formal access to policymaking deliberations
will lead not only to more informed substantive decisions but to greater tolerance,
inclusion, and respect for governance outcomes by participants who will feel that
88 See, e.g., Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States,
ed. Daniel J. Elazar (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 8, 60–153 (famously rejecting the
separationist “layer cake” model of American federalism for a “marble cake” model, with entangled
swirls of interlocking local and national input).
89 See sources cited supra note 18.
90 Ibid.
91 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 8, 237 (arguing “that pluralism provides a helpful
framework for understanding a hybrid world where normative assertions of multiple entities—both
state and nonstate—compete for primacy” with reference to Judith Resnick’s claim that federalism
creates multiple ports of entry for participation by various legal actors). See also Berman, “How Legal
Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct,” supra note 9, at 803 (“As such, successful mechanisms, institutions, or
practices will be those that simultaneously celebrate both local variation and international order, and
recognize the importance of preserving both multiple sites for contestation and an interlocking system
of reciprocity and exchange.”).
92 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 294 (“for both state-to-state disputes and disputes
among state and nonstate communities, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach permits a more direct
engagement with the issues of jurisdictional overlap and a far more nuanced and explicit effort to
negotiate among normative communities. Thus, the choice-of-law inquiry can itself become a
mechanism for managing, without eliminating, hybridity.”).
93 Ibid., 11 (calling for spaces to promote productive interaction among multiple, overlapping legal
systems by developing procedural mechanisms and institutions that aim to manage legal pluralism,
which would facilitate recognition of the interests of multiple communities and agreement among
competing norms); Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 339–76; Ryan, “Negotiating
Federalism,” supra note 19, at 102–27. See infra section 18.3.2. (discussing the use of procedural
consensus tools to overcome the lack of substantive consensus).
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their concerns have been taken seriously—even when their own views did not prevail.94
He advocates for the conscious design of “jurisgenerative” procedural mechanisms,
institutions, and discursive practices that maximize the opportunity for plural voices to
participate in societal decision-making.95
Such calls for dialogic processes as a means of good governance resonate profoundly
with the benefits touted by the champions of dynamic federalism, who make similar
claims in support of federal systems that encourage intersovereign dialogue and negotiation.96 For example, I used remarkably similar language to describe the promise of
dynamic federalism for improving governance in pluralist societies, pointing to the
mechanisms it enables for fostering negotiation, balancing stakeholder input, and navigating the contested values that so often underlie governance conflicts.97 Federalism
enables “multiple sites for political contest and innovation,” which have fortified the
United States against the forces of pluralist fragmentation, “effectively rechannel[ing]
regional frustration away from calls for secession and into a more cohesive fabric of
vibrant multilevel governance.”98 Discussed further in section 18.3, much of this
exchange takes place through various forms of intergovernmental bargaining by agents
from competing sources of sovereign authority.

18.3 The Shared Importance
of Dialogic Process
Paralleling claims by the proponents of dynamic federalism,99 the proponents of normative pluralism maintain that redesigning governance to account for multiple sources
of legal identity and authority will improve pluralist governance by creating shared
deliberative spaces that can more effectively channel normative conflict.100 Distilled, the
shared argument is that widening the circle of participation in negotiated decisionmaking will better account for key differences of perspective among citizens—which
may ultimately lead to better substantive decision-making and will at least encourage
greater investment by participants in the outcome.101
94 Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” supra note 14, at 669 (“Yet, we may find that the
added norms, viewpoints, and participants produce better decision-making, better adherence to those
decisions by participants and nonparticipants alike, and ultimately better real-world outcomes.”).
95 Ibid. (offering “principles that would undergird a more jurisgenerative constitutionalism, one
that seeks to manage, without eliminating, the plural voices clamoring to be heard”).
96 See supra notes 17–18.
97 E.g., Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 368; Ryan, “Secession and
Federalism,” supra note 19, at 153–68; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 3–11.
98 Ryan, “Secession and Federalism,” supra note 19, at 150, 162–69.
99 See sources cited supra note 18 and text accompanying supra notes 89–90.
100 See sources cited supra notes 1-2 and text accompanying supra note 17.
101 Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” supra note 14, at 669 (“Yet, we may find that the
added norms, viewpoints, and participants produce better decision-making, better adherence to those
decisions by participants and nonparticipants alike, and ultimately better real-world outcomes.”).
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Putting flesh on the bones of these bold claims, this section considers the extent to
which American federalism successfully promotes dialogic, negotiated governance, and
then reflects on the implications for normative pluralism’s claim for more inclusive
negotiated governance. First, it reviews the various ways in which dynamic federalism
fosters negotiated governance in the United States. Then, it considers the benefits that
dialogic processes confer on governance, using the example of Negotiated Rulemaking
in the United States. Finally, it explores the legitimizing values of bargained-for consensus as a procedural impasse tool for good governance when substantive agreement on
policy content cannot be achieved by other means.

18.3.1 Negotiated Federalism and Dialogic Process
In the United States, intergovernmental bargaining between local and national actors is
virtually endemic in areas of jurisdictional overlap, or those policy realms in which both
local and national actors hold legitimate regulatory interests or obligations.102 Broadly
understanding negotiation as “an iterative process of joint decision-making”103—that is,
any outcome resulting from multiple minds after some back-and-forth communication—
negotiated federalism encompasses a wide range of interjurisdictional governance in
the United States,104 and presumably elsewhere.
In Federalism and The Tug of War Within and preceding scholarship, I began the
process of cataloging the largely uncharted landscape of federalism bargaining in the
United States, building a taxonomy of at least ten different types of opportunities for
intergovernmental negotiation available within various constitutional and statutory
frameworks. 105 The taxonomy is organized into overarching categories of conventional
bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint policymaking bargaining:106
102 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 145–80.
103 See, e.g., Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In,
ed. Bruce Patton, 2nd ed. (New York: y, 1991), xvii (describing it as “back-and-forth communication
designed to reach agreement” whenever parties have both shared and differing interests); G. Richard
Shell, Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People (New York: Penguin Books,
1999), 6 (describing it as the “interactive communication process” that takes place when parties want
things from each other).
104 See generally Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of
War, supra note 18.
105 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 27; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War,
supra note 18, at 282 (“The final and most theoretically interesting category draws elements from the
prior two, partnering local and national actors in negotiations that lead to new substantive policies.
Joint policymaking forms include: (7) negotiated rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act; (8) policymaking laboratory negotiations, by which federal laws create ‘fill-in-the-blank’ state
policymaking zones and otherwise invite state proposals to modify federal law; (9) iterative
policymaking negotiations, which create a limited forum for shared state-federal policymaking over
time; and (10) intersystemic signaling negotiations, by which separately deliberating state and federal
actors trade influence over the direction of shared policy.”).
106 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 27; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 282.
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The conventional group includes examples in which the iterative process most
resembles colloquial understandings of bargaining as a simple exchange, or a
purposeful and time-bounded collective deliberation. These include: (1) interest
group representation bargaining, by which state actors lobby federal lawmakers;
(2) enforcement negotiations, including those over individual enforcement cases,
state-federal enforcement partnerships, and enforcement matters within programs of
cooperative federalism; and (3) negotiations over more administrative details,
resource allocation, or settlement of litigation . . . .
Negotiations to reallocate authority, or to depart from an otherwise established
legal order, take place in contexts of overlap in which a constitutional or statutory
provision provides an initial answer to the question of who gets to decide, but the
parties choose to bargain around that line. Examples include: (4) spending power
bargains, in which the federal government negotiates to extend its regulatory reach
into zones otherwise constitutionally reserved to the states [through the use of
conditional federal funding]; (5) bargained-for encroachment and commandeering,
two closely related (but occasionally unconstitutional) forms in which states bargain to assume federal power or become bound by federal law; and (6) negotiations
for various exceptions and permissions within frameworks of statutory law.
The final and most theoretically interesting category draws elements from the
prior two, partnering local and national actors in negotiations that lead to new
substantive policies. Joint policymaking forms include: (7) negotiated rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedure Act; (8) policymaking laboratory negotiations,
by which federal laws create “fill-in-the-blank” state policymaking zones and otherwise
invite state proposals to modify federal law; (9) iterative policymaking negotiations,
which create a limited forum for shared state-federal policymaking over time; and
(10) intersystemic signaling negotiations, by which separately deliberating state
and federal actors trade influence over the direction of shared policy. Negotiations
within this final category receive the most sustained attention because they hold the
most meaningful promise for bilaterally balanced federalism interpretation.107

This positive account of “federalism bargaining” describes negotiations between
competing sovereign agents that range from conventional political haggling, as over the
terms of proposed legislation;108 formalized methods of collaborative policymaking, as
created by various federal statutes, including the Medicaid health insurance program or
Coastal Zone Management Act;109 and more remote signaling processes by which state

107 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 282; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 27.
108 “State-federal negotiations that follow the conventional model are easily recognizable. For
example, state and federal executive actors frequently negotiate in a conventional manner over the
details of federal law that may impact the states, about law enforcement matters in which both hold
interests, and over administrative details within cooperative programs that include state and federal
participation.” Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 280, 282–87; Ryan, “Negotiating
Federalism,” supra note 19, at 28–36.
109 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 296, 311; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of
War, supra note 18, at 50–69.
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and federal actors share responsibility for evolving public decision-making over time,
for example, over medical marijuana enforcement.110
Some forums for conventional intergovernmental negotiation are purposefully created within other legal frameworks. For example, within some programs of cooperative
federalism, premised already on a bargained-for exchange of conditional federal funds,
Congress invites additional bargaining by inviting state participants to propose innovations to federal baselines, the details of which are often heavily negotiated with the
overseeing federal agencies.111 In addition, federal agencies sometimes invite state
stakeholders to negotiate the terms of administrative rulemaking early in the process,
affording them more influence than under the traditional model, in which stakeholders
may comment on an agency’s proposed rule only after work has neared completion.112
Other forms of bargaining depart even further from the conventional model. These
include forums for long-term, iterative sharing of policymaking authority with states
that may not even register at first as negotiation—such as the Clean Air Act’s formal
creation of a two-track vehicular emissions program, in which EPA sets one standard
but allows states to choose between that one or a competing standard set by California,
resulting in dynamic regulatory competition between the two standard-setters.113
Another example might be the intersystemic signaling that unfolds between state and
federal policymakers over issues like marijuana and immigration enforcement, which
effectively partners them in a subtle pattern of call and response, even as they are
nominally acting independently.114

18.3.2 The Benefits of Dialogic Governance
Writ large, then, American federalism is a negotiated dialogue among the various
levels and branches of government,115 balancing multiscalar input and the distinctive

110 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 311–14; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 69–74.
111 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 282; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 27.
112 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 282; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 27. See also Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 297–300; Ryan,
“Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 51–57 (discussing Negotiated Rulemaking);
Bertram I. Spector, “Negotiated Rulemaking: A Participative Approach to Consensus-Building for
Regulatory Development and Implementation,” Technical Notes, no. 10 (May 1999): 1–7. See
David M. Pritzker and Deborah S. Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).
113 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 281; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 26.
114 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 281; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 26.
115 See Erin Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the
Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally (A Response to Aziz Huq),” Columbia Law
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functional capacities of legislative, executive, and judicial decision-making.116 Negotiated
federalism affords opportunities for these multiple stakeholders to voice their concerns,
participate in governance, compete in policymaking, and renew their commitment to
the system that affords them these opportunities. Similar benefits of dialogic process are
also claimed by the champions of legal pluralism, who advocate for more normatively
inclusive dialogic processes in pluralist governance. If negotiated multiscalar govern
ance delivers on this promise, it might support the call for more normatively inclusive
negotiated governance. This section considers whether Negotiated Rulemaking, an
example of administrative bargaining in the American system, substantiates claims in
favor of negotiated governance—concluding that it can, at least in some instances.
The myriad examples of negotiated federalism support the assertion that dynamic
federalism provides a structural forum for intersovereign contestation and dialogue.
The most successful examples suggest that it can lead to more effective interjurisdictional governance than a less consultative process, especially in areas of intense jurisdictional contest, such as environmental117 and national security law.118 It is difficult
to produce statistically satisfying comparisons of negotiated governance and the
alternative, because it is almost never possible to run the same governing dilemma
through both governance methods in a scientific fashion. However, some evidence of
the dialogic benefits of negotiated governance can be found in the literature reviewing
negotiated rulemaking,119 a structured form of negotiated governance that partners
multiple stakeholders in complex administrative rulemaking.120 Comparisons between
negotiated rulemaking and the traditional notice-and-comment method, which involves
much less negotiation, indicate that the dialogic benefits predicted by legal pluralism
and dynamic federalism can be realized in appropriate contexts.
Negotiated Rulemaking is a tailored form of interest group bargaining in which
stakeholders and agency personnel work together to produce the elements of an
administrative regulation early on in the process of rulemaking.121 It stands in contrast
to traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which stakeholders are invited to
Review Sidebar 115 (2015): 4–38, 5 (discussing negotiated governance across both the vertical federalism
dimension and horizontal separation of powers dimension of American constitutionalism).
116 See generally Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of
War, supra note 18, at 265–367.
117 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18.
118 See Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 301–302; Ryan, “Negotiating
Federalism,” supra note 19, at 56–58 (discussing the failure of the REAL ID federal mandate in the
absence of prior state consultation).
119 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 (2018). See also Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of
War, supra note 18, at 297–300; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 51–55 (discussing
Negotiated Rulemaking).
120 Spector, supra note 112, at 2; Pritzker and Dalton, supra note 112; Cornelius M. Kerwin and
Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims,
and Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10, no. 3 (July 2000):
599–632.
121 This analysis first appeared in Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 52–53 and Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 298–99.
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provide responses to the agency’s proposed rule much later in the process, after the
agency has already invested substantial time and effort in its proposal.122 Participants in
negotiated rulemaking generally report that the process is usually more subjectively satisfying than traditional rulemaking—even for the government representatives who are
voluntarily ceding their primary rulemaking authority to the negotiated rulemaking
process.123 Participating agency personnel and regulated parties form more cooperative
relationships, facilitating both the future implementation and enforcement of the rules
created by the process.124 This affirms the intuitions of legal pluralists that dialogic proc
esses build stronger relationships within a polity, even among opposing interest groups.
In many ways, the results of negotiated rulemaking are also more efficient. The final
regulations are clearer to stakeholders and usually include fewer technical errors, so that
less overall time, money,, and effort are expended on enforcement.125 Shepherding a
proposed rule through public comment takes more time under negotiated rulemaking
than the traditional alternative, but negotiated rules receive fewer and more moderate
public comment during the public comment process and are less frequently challenged
in court by regulated entities.126 The final products of negotiated rulemaking are therefore implemented more quickly and with greater compliance from stakeholders than
the results of traditional rulemaking.127 Researchers report that the process also confers
valuable learning benefits on participants, who come to better understand the concerns
of other stakeholders.128 The process encourages participants to become more invested
in the consensus they help create, and they often go on to campaign for the success of the
regulations they help create with their constituent communities.129
Nevertheless, the literature also reports on the limitations of the Negotiated
Rulemaking model. Fair representation is critical to the success of negotiated rulemaking, but it can be difficult to ensure proper representation of all interest groups at the
negotiating table.130 The transparency characteristic of good governance can be compromised by prenegotiation consultations among the parties.131 Not all subject matter is
122 Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,” New
York University Environmental Law Journal 9 (2000): 60–151, 60–64; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of
War, supra note 18, at 298.
123 Pritzker and Dalton, supra note 112, at 3–5; Spector, supra note 112, at 2.
124 Cf. Freeman and Langbein, supra note 122, at 62; Kerwin and Langbein, supra note 120, at 610, 625.
125 Pritzker and Dalton, supra note 112, at 3–5; Spector, supra note 112, at 2.
126 Spector, supra note 112, at 2.
127 Ibid.
128 Gerard McMahon and Lawrence Susskind, “The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,”
Yale Journal on Regulation 3 (Fall 1985): 133–66, 161–65.
129 Ibid.
130 Cary Coglianese, “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking,” Duke Law Journal 46, no. 6 (Apr. 1997): 1255–350, 1261, 1321–34. But see Philip Harter,
“Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” New York University
Environmental Law Journal 9 (2000): 32–59, 39–44, 54–57 (challenging Coglianese’s methodology and
arguing that negotiated rulemaking has lived up to its promise).
131 Anonymous Interview, U.S. EPA, Office of the Administrator, Wash., D.C., Jan. 4, 2010 (noting
that the most protracted part of all state-federal bargaining is about “what the opening gambit will be”
when the formal negotiation begins, but also that this facilitates progress and that, “when we’re doing
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appropriately subject to negotiation, such as those matters impacting fundamental
rights, especially those of insular minorities.132 Finally, there is the impossibility of
achieving consensus when interests insufficiently overlap.133
Similar limitations can hamstring negotiated governance in all contexts, and they are
likely to hamper the seamless deployment of normative legal pluralism as well. In the
context of negotiated federalism, depending on the circumstances, the need to break a
deadlock may justify the use of preemptive authority. It is not as clear how legal pluralism
should cope. But as in all cases of negotiation, questions of preferable alternatives loom
large. American federalism also demonstrates examples where the choice to preempt without engagement led to total failures of governance, as in the case of the REAL ID Act,
enacted to improve identification after the 9/11 attacks—in which the states simply declined
to comply with federal mandates after having been cut out of the policymaking process.134
Accordingly, the architects of governance must query whether it is preferable to risk deadlock in pursuit of consensus or risk the backlash that can follow a failure to consult at all.

18.3.3 Consensus Process as Best Alternative
Dynamic federalism and legal pluralism also herald the value of bargained-based consensus as a procedural impasse tool in policymaking arenas where substantive agreement
cannot be procured by other means. Bargained-for consent, when it is genuine, can procedurally legitimize negotiated results in the absence of substantive agreement on content. Mutual consent ensures fairness, “on the theory that no deal is reached unless all
parties agree, and reasonable negotiators will not bargain for results that contravene
their best interests.”135 Genuine consent is procured when bargainers who can be trusted
to (1) understand their own interests and (2) faithfully represent their principals (3)
reach a bilateral agreement that each side genuinely prefers to no agreement.136 Through
the iterative process of communication, compromise, assessment, and agreement, bargainers regularly substitute mutual consent for substantive agreement on the merits.137
our job, there are lots of conversations like these early on in the process”); Ryan, Federalism and the Tug
of War, supra note 18, at 299.
132 Cf. Owen Fiss, “Against Settlement,” Yale Law Journal 93 (1983–1984): 1073–90, 1076.
133 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 39–44, 54–57.
134 National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. See Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 301–302 (discussing the failure of the Act); Ryan,
“Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 56–58.
135 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 343; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 105.
136 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 342–47; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 105–10 (“If negotiators truly understand their own interests and pursue them faithfully,
then we can trust that they will not consent to terms that undermine their interests. And as long as
they can truly walk away from the bargaining table when no beneficial deal is possible, then we can
trust that the terms they negotiate benefit all parties more than no agreement at all.”).
137 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 342–47; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 105–10.
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Scholars in both fields argue that bargaining is often the best (and sometimes, the
only) available alternative for bridging pluralist dissensus.138 When parties cannot reach
substantive consensus about why an outcome is legitimate, they substitute procedural
consensus by agreeing to defer to the results of a fair bargaining process, legitimized by
the above principles of mutual consent.139 As I explained in Federalism and the Tug of
War Within,
For thousands of years, human cultures worldwide have turned to procedurallybased negotiated outcomes when mired in substantive disagreement, essentially
substituting procedural consensus for the missing substantive consensus. Negotiators
defer to bargained-for results on the simple grounds that, even without a more convincing substantive rationale, the results must hold merit if all parties are willing to
abide by them. In other words, even if the parties cannot agree on a rationale that
explains why the negotiated result is the right outcome, if they can actually agree on
some outcome that they all prefer to a stalemate—then, goes the wisdom of bargaining, that outcome must be a worthy choice. If it was reached through a fair process
of exchange, then it holds decisional gravity that exceeds random chance or a forced
alternative, and warrants deference in the future.140

Wisely crafted forums for negotiated governance should include procedural mechanisms to help ensure that bargaining will be consistent with the consent principles that
legitimize bargaining in general, and I have recommended opportunities to engineer
legitimizing procedures into state-federal bargaining at the level of regulatory design.141
The value of negotiated governance can go beyond the mere accomplishment of any
agreement. In the federalism context, I suggest that negotiation is not just a de facto
response to regulatory uncertainty about who should decide, but can itself be a constitutionally legitimate way of deciding, especially when other governance mechanisms have
failed.142 Competing sovereign agents frequently use consent-based process to navigate
federalism dilemmas that other means of constitutional interpretation have failed to
clarify—for reasons of political gridlock, regulatory abdication, litigation, or other
138 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 11 (calls to create spaces for productive
interaction among multiple, overlapping legal systems by developing procedural mechanisms
and institutions that aim to manage the legal pluralism that is all around us, which facilitates
recognition of the interests of multiple communities and agreement among competing norms);
Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 339–76; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 102–27.
139 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 343; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 106 (“Lacking substantive consensus about why the outcome is legitimate, the parties
thereby substitute procedural consensus in agreeing to defer to the results of fair bargaining.”).
140 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 342; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 105.
141 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 362–67; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 128–35.
142 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 339–42; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 102–104.
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obstacles.143 I argue that these negotiated results warrant deference if both the
legitimizing principles of bargained-for consent are honored144 and the negotiation
process is consistent with the procedural expressions of the core federalism values that
constrain good multiscalar governance in any context.145
Not all federalism bargaining will satisfy these criteria.146 But when it does, bilaterally
negotiated outcomes warrant interpretive deference as a means of implementing
constitutional federalism directives,147 when we understand federalism interpretation
as a means of constraining public behavior to be consistent with constitutional values.148
Indeed, surveying the landscape of jurisdictional overlap yields many instances in
which the very process of intergovernmental bargaining proves more able to balance
competing constitutional values than judicial or legislative decisions alone.149
Legal pluralist Paul Schiff Berman similarly advocates for the deployment of dialogic,
consensus-based processes to bridge normative divides in which the prospect of forging
substantive agreement is daunting. He argues that pluralism recognizes the inevitability
of normative conflict, but rather than attempting to erase it, a pluralist framework “seeks
to manage it through procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that might at
least draw the participants to the conflict into a shared social space.”150 He observes
that this approach “draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that agreements are reached
principally through participation in common forms of life, rather than through agreement on substance.”151 Better still, dialogic processes afford participants the opportunity to learn more about the concerns of their counterparts, opening greater possibilities
for forging consensus on even the substance.152
143 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 339–42; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 102–104.
144 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 342–47; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 105–10.
145 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 347–56; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 110–21.
146 See Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 349; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 113–14 (“Bargaining that allocates authority through processes that weaken rights,
threaten democratic participation, undermine innovation, and frustrate problem-solving is not
consistent with federalism values, and warrants no interpretive deference.”).
147 See Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 349; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 113–14 (“Bargaining that procedurally safeguards rights, enhances participation, fosters
innovation, and harnesses interjurisdictional synergy accomplishes what federalism is designed to
do—and what federalism interpretation is ultimately for. As such, it warrants interpretive deference
from a reviewing court, or any branch actor interrogating the result. Of course, not all federalism
bargaining will do so. . . . The more consistency with these values of good governing process, the more
interpretive deference is warranted; the less procedural consistency with these values, the less
interpretive deference is warranted.”).
148 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 272–73; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,”
supra note 19, at 11–14.
149 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 367; Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra
note 19, at 5.
150 Berman, “Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism,” supra note 14, at 665, 675–76.
151 Ibid.
152 See Berman, “Federalism, International Law, and Legal Pluralism,” supra note 8 (arguing that
“jurisdictional redundancy operating in the transnational, international, and federalist realm . . . show
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Berman suggests that building these shared social spaces will require the creation of
“procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing pluralism” that will
inspire participants to wrestle with the difficult questions of multiple affiliation rather
than shunting aside normative difference.153 He advocates for constitutional mechanisms for managing global legal pluralism that capitalize on the use of procedural constraints to shepherd pluralist deliberation in healthy directions of inclusion, tolerance,
and engagement.154 He proposes a variety of such mechanisms to encourage dialectical
legal interactions between competing normative interests, including many that resonate
with the procedural tools of dynamic federalism, such as subsidiarity schemes, preserved spaces for local variation, hybrid participation agreements, and purposeful jurisdictional redundancy.155

18.4 The Shared Rejection
of Zero-Sum Governance
In addition to their shared emphasis on dialogic processes as a tool of good governance,
the legal pluralism and dynamic federalism discourses share three meta-phenomenal
features, explored in this section. First, both contain positive and normative elements
that are markedly disaggregable, in that interpreters might subscribe to both accounts,
or they might accept the positive account while rejecting the normative account. More
importantly, both models begin by rejecting the zero-sum assumptions that left their
respective predecessors unable to account for the full dynamics of on-the-ground
governance. Finally, both models must nevertheless contend with the possibility of circumstances where the zero-sum analogy holds.

18.4.1 Disaggregating the Positive and the Normative
As discussed earlier, legal pluralism and dynamic federalism include both positive and
normative elements, with distinctive roles in the discourse. The positive elements are
devices of description, by which each attempts to convey an accurate, working model of
the elements of governance on which they focus. The positive account takes no position
on whether the picture it paints is attractive or unattractive, or desirable or undesirable;
it simply tells a story. By contrast, the normative elements are value-judgment based
proposals, asserting how good governance should work, and what must be done to
accomplish that. In both discourses, these elements are frequently disaggregated.
how the existence of multiple fora can both empower voices that might otherwise be silenced and effect
changes of legal consciousness over time”).
153 Ibid., 677.
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Again, each discourse begins with a positive account of the status quo that, it claims,
better captures the complex dynamics of actual governance than the preexisting model.
Legal pluralism describes the simultaneous normative force of multiple sources of
authority and the complex dynamics this creates for the individuals and entities within
cosmopolitan societies.156 Dynamic federalism describes the richness of intersovereign
engagement in the negotiation of interjurisdictional governance, and the interpretive
possibilities it creates.157 In both cases, the positive account is persuasive, because it
conveys a reality that, once described, is hard to discount. Multiple sources of authority
do exert normative force in pluralist societies, and modern federalism is clearly marked
by intergovernmental engagement.
The two discourses then advance normative accounts, both of which prove more controversial than their descriptive counterparts.158 Legal pluralism shifts from describing
the fact of normative overlap to advocating for the institution of more inclusive dialogic
processes to improve governance by engaging all communities of interest.159 Similarly,
dynamic federalism moves from the observation that intersovereign engagement abounds
to the assertion that it leads to better governance than separation, for many of the
same reasons.160 Interjurisdictional governance achieved through consultation and
negotiation is more likely to produce outcomes that appropriately balance the values
and interests in conflict, and in which participants who feel respected are more likely to
invest meaning. Both normative accounts hinge on the good governance benefits of
inclusion, engagement, and negotiation, and both herald the value of procedurally
derived consensus when substantive agreement is unavailable.161
Markedly in the legal pluralism and dynamic federalism discourses, these positive
and normative accounts can be—and frequently are—disaggregated. That is, the
interpreters or architects of governance might subscribe to both accounts, or they might
accept the positive account while rejecting the normative account. Many governance
scholars reluctant to embrace the normative proposals associated with legal pluralism
have nevertheless acceded to its description of the multiple legal identities juggled by
individual actors and the overlapping normative forces of both state-based and nonstate
sources.162 Similarly, many federalism scholars have accepted the positive account of

AQ1

AQ2
AQ3

156 See supra notes 1-2, 14–15.
157 See supra note 18.
158 See, e.g., supra, notes 11–13 (listing scholarship skeptical of legal pluralism model); Greve, The
Upside-Down Constitution, supra note 18; Young, supra note 18 (examples of scholarship skeptical of
dynamic federalism). See also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, “Partisan Federalism,” Harvard Law Review 127,
no. 4 (Feb. 2014): 1077–146 (arguing that the dynamics of American federalism are further complicated
by ideologically polarized party politics, enabling states to check federal action by channeling partisan
conflict through the institutional frameworks of the federal structure); Bulman-Pozen and Gerken,
“Uncooperative Federalism,” supra note 18, at 1258–60 (arguing that dynamic federalism is marked by
stonewalling as well as collaboration).
159 See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
160 See sources cited supra note 18, 82-83.
161 See sources cited supra notes 1-2 (legal pluralism), 18 (dynamic federalism), and 83–85
(advocating negotiated governance).
162 See, e.g., Berman, “How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct,” supra note 9 (in responding to
Galán and Patterson’s critique of his pluralism normative proposals, first noting the significance of the
fact that they accepted his pluralism descriptive account). For the quoted text, see supra note 15.
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dynamic exchange and intergovernmental bargaining in federalism without endorsing
the normative claim that it is an effective means of governing.163

18.4.2 The Rejection of Zero-Sum Governance

Q1

Q2

Q3

AQ4

The next shared feature likely accounts for the controversy that each normative account
has generated in comparison to its paired positive account. In contending for their
normative visions of good governance, both legal pluralism and dynamic federalism
reject critical assumptions underlying the preceding theoretical model about the allocation of authority within governance.
The pluralist model departs from the prior monist model, in which legitimate legal
authority derives only from a territorial sovereign.164 Dynamic federalism departs from
the separationist dual federalism model, which polices an idealized boundary between
mutually exclusive spheres of national and local regulatory authority.165 Yet the most
important similarity here is how the rejected assumptions are themselves related. In
rejecting the prior models of monism and separationist federalism, legal pluralism and
dynamic federalism each reject the “zero-sum” approach to governance embraced by
their intellectual predecessors.

18.4.2.1 Rejecting Zero-Sum Federalism
The entrenched role of negotiation in American federalism reveals a dynamic relationship between state and federal power that departs from the stylized, strict separationist
model that predates it, one which I previously coined “zero-sum” federalism.166 The
zero-sum model of federalism, which predominated the American federalism discourse
until relatively recently, assumes that jurisdiction is a finite and fixed-sum competitive
resource, in which more for one competitor necessarily means less for the other.167
Focusing on sovereign antagonism within the federal system, it envisions the federal
and state governments as locked in a bitter, winner-takes-all struggle for power, in
which every jurisdictional gain by one side represents a loss for the other.168 By contrast, the dynamic federalism model acknowledges sovereign competition while also
recognizing the ways in which engagement enhances the ability of both sovereigns to
163 See, e.g., Greve, Upside-Down Constitution, supra note 18.
164 See supra notes 3, 11–14.
165 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 109–44.
166 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 4–5 (“Reconceptualizing the relationship
between state and federal power as one heavily mediated by negotiation demonstrates how federalism
practice departs from the rhetoric, and offers hope for moving beyond the paralyzing features of the
zero-sum discourse.”); Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at xiii; Erin Ryan,
“Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum Game,” Administrative and Regulatory Law News 38 (Fall
2012): 4–7.
167 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 4; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 267.
168 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 4; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 267.
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achieve their regulatory goals and obligations.169 Countless real-world examples of
interjurisdictional governance reveals that the boundary between state and federal
authority is less a bright line and more an ongoing project of negotiation, taking place on
levels both large and small.170
For example, in advocating for both the positive and normative features of dynamic
federalism in environmental law, Professors David Adelman and Kristen Engel specifically target a zero-sum model of environmental governance for rejection in their
proposal. They frame this version of zero-sum federalism as the “matching principle,”
directing that regulatory authority be assigned to the level of government that roughly
“matches” the geographic scope of the subject problem, and exclusively to that level.171
As they explain:
A hallmark of environmental federalism is that neither federal nor state governments
limit themselves to what many legal scholars have deemed to be their appropriate
domains. The federal government continues to regulate local issues, such as remediation of contaminated industrial sites, which have few direct interstate connections
and few benefits from federal uniformity. At the same time, state and local governments are not content to confine their attention to issues of local concern, but are
developing policies on environmental issues of national or even international scale,
such as global climate change. Nor do environmental issues “stay” in the control of
any particular level of government, but rather tend to pass back and forth between
them like the proverbial football. The current system of environmental federalism is
thus a dynamic one of overlapping federal and state jurisdiction . . . .
This dynamic system is [] antithetical to the prevailing economic orthodoxy of federalism scholars. Legal academics have long maintained that an optimal level of
government exists for regulating a given environmental problem. The orthodox
view, which we refer to as the “matching principle,” is premised on the elementary
economic theory that efficient regulation is possible only when the regulating entity
fully internalizes the costs and benefits of its policies. A corollary of this principle is
that the regulatory authority should reside at the level of government that roughly
“matches” the geographic scope of the subject environmental problem. Hence
regulation of intrastate groundwater ought to be regulated by state and local governments, whereas climate change should be addressed at the international level.
This static model is incompatible with the existing dynamic system, as it precludes
overlapping and shifting regulatory authority between the states and federal
government.172

Instead, they advocate a dynamic model of federalism that more accurately reflects the
reality of U.S. environmental governance, and through its ability to respond adaptively
to changing circumstances, produces what they see as better normative results:
169 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 4; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 267.
170 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 6.
171 See Adelman and Engel, supra note 18, at 1798.
172 Ibid., 1796–98.
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We reject the traditional static optimization model for an adaptive one. Our approach
draws on an emerging trend in legal scholarship that calls for a dynamic model of
federalism. We start with the unremarkable observation that environmental problems are multifaceted. Sources of environmental harm may be the manifestation of
numerous failures, market as well as regulatory, that arise along numerous dimensions and at widely variant temporal and spatial scales. Further, the initiative to
address environmental problems will originate from more than one level of government based upon a variety of political, socioeconomic, and environmental factors,
each differing from the other in the mix of these variables. This diversity of contexts
proves to be an essential asset in a complex and dynamic world.
The simplicity of the matching principle, in this light, comes at a significant price
because it assumes away much of the inherent complexity of environmental problems. Further, the static nature of the matching principle’s economic model ignores
the constantly shifting landscape in which environmental policy is set, with its disruptions from both natural processes and human interventions. Rigid adherence to
the matching principle . . . is counterproductive in such an environment because it
increases the risks of freezing policies in local maxima (dead ends) and decreases
responsiveness to changing environmental conditions.173

Indeed, it should not be surprising that so much federalism-sensitive governance is
accomplished through dynamic collaboration, competition, and negotiation, given
how these features are built into the very structure of American government.174 The
bicameral nature of the legislature, the presidential veto, and even the subtle invitation
to iterative policymaking afforded by judicial review—prompting Congress to try again
to meet constitutional muster, or signaling the concerns that future legislators must
heed175—all speak to the way American governance is, by design, an iterative process of
joint decision-making. The interest-group representation model of democratic govern
ance itself anticipates how lawmaking will reflect the results of bargaining between competing interest groups.176 Federalism affords federal supremacy and Tenth Amendment
protection for those instances in which decision-making truly is a zero-sum game—but
dynamic federalism suggests they may be far fewer than the zero-sum model of dual
federalism assumed.

173 Ibid., 1798–1800.
174 Ryan, “Negotiating Federalism,” supra note 19, at 8; Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra
note 18, at 281.
175 For example, Congress designed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA) in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 invalidation of the Religious Freedom
and Restoration Act (RFRA) as exceeding legislative authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
RLUIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to -5
(2006)); RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
176 Jody Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” UCLA Law Review 45
(Oct. 1997): 1–98, 4–8 (proposing a model of collaborative governance that involves multiple levels of
cooperation).
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18.4.2.2 Rejecting Statist Monism
Similarly, the legal pluralists have rejected statist monism, which assumes that allowing
normative competition from non-sovereignty-based sources will undermine the state.
In doing so, legal pluralists are calling for a non-zero-sum normative world—a legal
order in which law is composed, or at least influenced, by the full variety of norms and
principles that influence the people within it.177 The insight of legal pluralism is that
more can be merrier, and even if all norms do not end up equally persuasive in the marketplace of ideas, we are all better off when these normative sources are acknowledged
and contended with, rather than swept under a rug. That swept-under norm could be
critical to understanding those outside the majority community. It might just be a really
good idea.
For example, Professor Monica Hakima argues that the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the international institution governing cross-border trade, was routinely the
site of pluralist conflict that strengthened, rather than corroded, the effectiveness of the
institution.178 As this history of pluralism conflict within the WTO demonstrates,
Hakimi explains that “ineradicable governance conflicts are not necessarily dissociative
for a political community. . . . Rather, allowing these people to keep having their conflicts
in relatively constructive ways can itself be productive for the group. Conflict is a way for
those with diverse priorities to engage together on and invest in their joint enterprise
and thus to preserve it as a going concern that binds them.”179 By her account, enabling
discursive pluralist competition to play out at the WTO strengthened the entire community, rather than simply creating zero-sum winners and losers in a given instance.
Legal pluralism thus heralds the promise of greater normative inclusivity. Its
advocates contend that opening the process to more voices will improve governance by
facilitating exchange, encouraging normative competition, and enabling nonstate norm
generators to contribute in contexts where state-based law may never be as effective.180
Pluralism opens the door to innovation by inviting the creative capacity of nongovernment actors into realms where they might even outperform the state (or where the state

177 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 12.
178 Monica Hakimi, “The Integrative Effects of Global Legal Pluralism,” in this volume, chapter 20.
179 Ibid.
180 See, e.g., Janet K. Levit, “A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments,” Yale Journal of International Law 30 (Winter 2005): 125–210
(contrasting the “top-down” approach, in which states enact rules that govern the behavior of those
subject to the rules with the “bottom-up” approach, in which the practices of nonstate actors
inform the making of the rules that then evolve to govern those same actors); Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that industry-generated corporate codes of conduct
may “regulate” behavior more effectively than state sanctions because the threat of consumer
mobilization may be more motivating than the possibility of state-based enforcement); Hendry and
Tatum, supra note 7, at 95 (discussing benefits when indigenous communities translate culturally
normative practices into legal norms but critiquing the fact that “a lack of reciprocity on the part of
the dominant U.S. legal culture means that these benefits have been necessarily limited”); Resnik,
“Law’s Migration,” supra note 17, at 1579.
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is manifestly underperforming).181 Ideally, pluralist structures, institutions, and
procedures can strengthen the overall conversation simply by enabling new players to
join it. Pluralists point to compelling examples of productive dialectic between private
and state-based authorities, including federal deference to Native American courts, the
influence of international professional associations like the International Chamber of
Commerce, and even transnational corporations and NGOs.182

18.4.3 Contending with Zero-Sum Realities?
All that said, the idea of nonstate-based sources of “law” provokes deep anxiety for those
who worry that the state is best positioned to protect the liberal values and fundamental
rights that most democratic societies hold dear.183 If we entertain sources of law from
beyond the state, will that weaken the ability of the state to guarantee good governance?
If religious law holds currency in a pluralist society, what will that mean for members of
a minority faith, or no faith at all? Can we trust the purveyors of private norms to be as
zealous in protecting the public interest as the public institutions of government?
These are serious concerns, although it is worth considering whether they assume
that the liberal state is performing better in this capacity than it really is—in some
contexts, perhaps more mistakenly than others. Of course, not every sovereign state
is a liberal state with these values, making the concern inapposite in some nations
from the start. But even among those nations that purport to be liberal states, we hear
increasingly cogent critiques of the idea that the liberal state is the best vindicator of
these liberal values of good governance. In the United States alone, consider the intractable problems we are currently experiencing regarding democratic accountability and
181 Calliess and Jarass, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the role of the International Chamber of
Commerce in the regulatory void left after World War II); Amnon Lehavi, “Unbundling
Harmonization; Public versus Private Law Strategies to Globalize Property,” Chicago Journal of
International Law 15, no. 2 (Winter 2015): 452–517, 455 (discussing the ability of private actors to
conform to global systems and how global private lawmaking demonstrate the ‘power that society,
culture and history exert upon law’s empire.’ ”).
182 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 167 (noting that “[e]ven outside the context of
Islamic law, the U.S. Supreme Court has at times deferred to the independent parallel courts
maintained by American Indian populations located within U.S. territorial borders” [referring to Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)]); Cécile Pelaudeix, “Governance of Artic Offshore Oil: Gas
Activities: Multilevel Governance and Legal Pluralism at Stake,” Arctic Yearbook (2015), 3 (arguing that
many normative communities “articulate norms without formal state power behind them,” and that
private sector actors, including transnational corporations and NGOs, “design norms and values in the
offshore activities, potentially leading to a situation of legal pluralism where legal systems overlap.”);
Calliess and Jarass, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the ICC).
183 See, e.g., Isiksel, supra note 9, at 187 (“In liberal democracies, constitutional rule safeguards
pluralism against its own excesses by ‘select[ing] a subset of worthy values, bring[ing] them to the
foreground, and subordinat[ing] others to them.’ Constitutionalism combats this anarchical tendency
by highlighting some values as more central to the public weal than others. However, in the absence of
such an authoritative ordering of principles, ends, and prerogatives, pluralism in the global legal realm
runs a more immediate risk.”).
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campaign finance issues.184 Similar issues have bedeviled the European Union, leading
to withdrawal movements such as Brexit.185
Nevertheless, such anxiety begs the question whether there may be legal realms
pertinent to the legal pluralism proposal that, as in the federalism context, really are
zero-sum games—legal realms in which allowing nonstate actors to play meaningfully
diminishes the ability of the state to govern effectively. Strengthening the authoritative
force of private norms could harmfully displace state law in those realms in which
state-based law really does perform better. For example, while environmentalists are
pleased that private industry seeks to self-regulate under principles of Corporate Social
Responsibility, many worry that allowing these private norms to displace formal environmental regulation by the government could dangerously undermine public health
and the environment.186
This brief consideration barely scratches the surface of these issues, many of which
have been well-trod elsewhere.187 However, the zero-sum analytical framework signals
several important questions on which more research is needed. For example, if there are
zero-sum realms in the statist-pluralist context, how can we identify them? And having
identified them, how can we ascertain which sources of law will be more effective to
resolve the identified problem? Important scholarly canons provide us a starting point
for thinking about these issues, such as John Braithwaite’s work on social capital188 and
Elinor Ostrom’s work on private regulation,189 yet much remains for the next generation
of scholars in this important and ongoing conversation. For even if we identified areas
where we might prefer one kind of regulation or another, how could we meaningfully
protect zones of exclusive jurisdiction for each where it may be needed? After all, even
when a lawmaking community attempts to exclude alternative normative communities,
184 See, e.g., Russ Feingold, “The Money Crises: How Citizens United Undermines Our Elections
and the Supreme Court,” Stanford Law Review Online 64 (June 2012): 145–51 (“Super PACs, now
ubiquitous across the political spectrum, can collect unlimited funds from corporations and
individuals, and then spend that money to elect or defeat candidates for office, so long as that work is
not ‘coordinated’ with the candidate campaigns themselves. In practical terms, super PACs can now
legally use barely-disclosed money from corporate treasuries to produce blisteringly negative television
ads attacking candidates and elected officials directly.”).
185 See, e.g., Timothy Garton Ash, “Liberal Europe Isn’t Dead Yet. But Its Defenders Face a Long,
Hard Struggle,” Guardian, July 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/09/
liberal-europe-isnt-dead-struggle.
186 See, e.g., Dan Pontefract, “Faking Corporate Social Responsibility Does Not Fool Employees,”
Forbes, Sept. 24, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danpontefract/2016/09/24/faking-corporatesocial-responsibility-does-not-fool-employees/#2b1a33f57994; Bruce Watson, “The Troubling Evolution
of Corporate Greenwashing,” Guardian, Aug. 20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2016/aug/20/greenwashing-environmentalism-lies-companies.
187 See supra notes 11–14.
188 See, e.g., John Braithwaite, “The Regulatory State?,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political
Institutions, eds. Sarah Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009); John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation,” U.B.C. Law Review 44, no. 3 (2011):
475–520.
189 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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positive accounts of both legal pluralism and dynamic federalism suggest that such
efforts may fail.
On this last point, it is worth recalling that even dynamic federalism relies on the
twin devices of preemption and deference to protect the regulatory prerogatives of
each sovereign in realms that fall outside the zone of jurisdictional overlap. Dynamic
federalism is more determinative than unbridled pluralism, because the federal government retains the constitutional trump card of federal supremacy (and in the United
States, the Supreme Court has shown periodic—if inconsistent—willingness to enforce
jurisdictional boundaries).190 Yet even then, ongoing state resistance to federal marriage, marijuana, and immigration policies demonstrate that hierarchy cannot always
eliminate the forces of legal pluralism.191
To be sure, the hierarchical supremacy of federalism is inconsistent with true
constitutional pluralism, and it may be antithetical to pluralism more generally. On the
other hand, it boasts advantage as a practical means of resolving conflict in circumstances where that has been adjudicated necessary. Correspondingly, the American
Tenth Amendment provides constitutional fortification for a zone of local authority
against national preemption. It will be interesting to see whether these devices of federalism, which initially seem so ill-fitting to pluralism, will nevertheless hold currency
in the evolution of an operational model. Or, alternatively, whether the policing of
jurisdictional boundaries will always prove vulnerable under conditions of serious
social contestation.

18.5 Conclusion
This Handbook defines the field of legal pluralism and charts a conceptual path forward
at a moment in history—rent by pluralist conflict—that highlights the need for intersystemic dialogue, now more than ever. Legal pluralism provides a critical perspective on
contemporary legal relationships that challenges the hegemonic model of uniform,
monist, and even sovereignty-based legal relationships, just as the new dynamic federalism model challenges the strict separationism of traditional dual federalism.
Just as dynamic federalism has forced our reconsideration of dualism, the critique of
monism framed by legal pluralism is persuasive—especially in legal realms that intrinsically transgress the old-fashioned monist model, such as the internet, indigenous
peoples, international trade, and global environmental challenges. It helps deconstruct
the complicated issues of legal identity and orientation faced by individuals and entities
operating in environments transected by competing normative authorities, be they
190 Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War, supra note 18, at 68–104 (tracing the vacillating history of
judicially enforceable federalism constraints in the United States).
191 See Ryan, “Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within,” supra note 19, at 355–56 (reviewing
federalism controversies involving gay marriage, recreational marijuana policy, and immigration
enforcement).
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from state law, religion, professional norms, corporate governance, or other sources.
Yet legal pluralism also raises troubling questions about the relationship between statebased and nonstate laws, the appropriateness of legal hierarchy and heterarchy, and
whether there are zones of state or private authority that should be protected from one
another, as constitutional federalism attempts.
While a fully normative theory of legal pluralism may remain inchoate, the institution of federalism provides an uncontroversial example of simple legal pluralism in
practice. In recognizing the operation of multiple sources of sovereign authority within
the same geographic territory, federalism creates a legal realm that is pluralist by
definition—while sidestepping the vexing questions that pluralism raises about the
commensurability of state-based and nonstate norms.
Federalism also provides a model of working pluralism in which many of the benefits
of legal pluralism heralded by its champions are made manifest. The dynamic federalism model demonstrates the potential of the pluralist project in fostering the interactive,
dialogic, and dynamic features of intergovernmental negotiation that federalism enables
and to which pluralism aspires. Federalism creates a formal structure for governance in
which those holding conflicting values and interests can compete and collaborate
toward a fully informed, jointly constructed, and often hard-won consensus. Yet many
federalisms rely on a preemptive hierarchy between sovereigns that, while not dispositive in all instances, aims to limit some of the uncertainty that worry pluralism’s critics.
The American model has hardly worked out the pickle of federal supremacy, and the
European model takes an entirely different approach.
The relationship between federalism and pluralism is thus one of simultaneous
opposition and overlap—not unlike the subjects of governance that they explore. As the
ongoing federalism and pluralism discourses unfold, it will be interesting to see where
they continue to converge and diverge, and what each can learn from the other.
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